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Government	Recurrent	Expenditure	and	Economic	Growth	in	Less	Developed	Countries	
DAVID	LIM	
Griffith	University,	Nathan,	Brisbane,	Australia	
Summary.	-	There	is	not	much	support	in	less	developed	countries	for	the	hypothesis	that	
recurrent	government	expenditure	is	seen	as	consumption	and	hence	more	dispensable	than	
capital	expenditure.	There	is	little	evidence	of	a	secular	decline	in	recurrent	expenditure	for	a	
group	of	54	less	developed	countries	over	the	period	1965-1973,	nor	is	there	strong	evidence	
of	greater	instability	in	recurrent	expenditure.	
INTRODUCTION	
It	has	often	been	claimed	that	many	governments	of	less	developed	countries	(LDCs)	tend	
to	regard	capital	expenditure	as	investment	and	recurrent	expenditure	as	consumption.1	
Economic	growth	is	seen	to	depend	largely	on	investment	so	that	government	recurrent	
expenditure	has	to	be	curbed	in	order	to	generate	‘public	savings’	for	investment	purposes.	
There	are	also	political	reasons	for	this	belief.	Governments	are	more	likely,	at	least	in	the	
short-run,	to	obtain	greater	political	benefits	by	having	more,	but	less	efficient,	projects	
than	by	having	fewer,	but	more	efficient,	ones.	The	former	are	simply	more	visible	and	so	
more	politically	rewarding.	
One	important	implication	of	this	view	is	that	scarce	government	revenue	is	more	likely	to	
be	spent	on	new	projects	or	on	the	expansion	of	existing	ones	than	on	the	recurrent	
operational	and	maintenance	expenditures	of	existing	projects.	There	are	certainly	
examples	in	LDCs	of	new	schools	being	built	and	opened	without	there	being	sufficient	
qualified	teachers	to	man	them	or	the	existing	one.	Examples	also	abound	of	new	
agricultural	projects	being	started	while	existing	ones	are	short	of	extension	services.	If	such	
practices	are	the	rule	rather	than	the	exception,	we	would	expect	the	share	of	recurrent	
expenditure	in	total	government	expenditure	to	fall	over	the	years,	resulting	in	the	under-
utilization	and	the	neglect	of	projects.	
Another	important	implication	is	that	recurrent	expenditure	will	fluctuate	more	than	capital	
expenditure.	As	recurrent	expenditure	is	regarded	as	consumption	it	is	therefore	more	
dispensable	than	capital	expenditure	and	more	likely	to	bear	the	brunt	of	any	instability	in	
government	revenue.	While	the	problems	posed	by	instability	in	recurrent	expenditure	may	
be	less	serious	for	economic	growth	than	those	posed	by	a	secular	decline	in	it,	they	cannot	
be	ignored	altogether.	Given	the	complementarity	of	recurrent	and	capital	expenditures	in	
most	projects,	uncertainty	in	the	supply	of	the	former	will	reduce	the	overall	productivity	of	
these	projects.		
The	secular	decline	in	and	the	instability	of	recurrent	expenditure	may	therefore	reduce	the	
productivity	of	development	projects,	with	subsequent	adverse	effects	on	economic	
growth.	This	paper	does	not	attempt	to	show	empirically	the	relationship	between	the	
secular	decline	in	and	the	instability	of	recurrent	expenditure,	on	the	one	hand,	and	
economic	growth,	on	the	other.	Its	aims	are	the	rather	more	limited	ones	of	seeing:	(i)	
whether	there	had	been	a	secular	decline	in	recurrent	expenditure,	and	(ii)	whether	
recurrent	expenditure	had	fluctuated	more	than	capital	expenditure,	for	a	group	of	54	LDCs	
over	the	period	1965-1973.	
2.	SECULAR	DECLINE	IN	RECURRENT	EXPENDITURE	
In	order	to	test	for	the	secular	decline	in	recurrent	expenditure,	the	following	linear	
regressions	on	time	(t)	were	estimated	for	each	of	the	54	LDCs	in	the	sample:	
	 TRE/TRCE	=	a1	+	b1(t)	 (1)	
	 REA/TEA		=	a2	+	b2(t)	 (2)	
	 REE/TEE		=	a3	+	b3(t)	 (3)	
	 REH/TEH	=	a4	+	b4(t)	 (4)	
	 RET/TET		=	a5	+	b5(t)	 (5)	
	
TRE/TRCE	is	the	percentage	share	of	government	recurrent	expenditure	(TRE)	in	total	
government	expenditure	(TRCE);	REA/TEA	the	percentage	share	of	government	recurrent	
expenditure	on	agriculture	(REA)	in	total	government	expenditure	on	agriculture	(TEA);	
REE/TEE	the	percentage	share	of	government	recurrent	expenditure	on	education	(REE)	in	
total	government	expenditure	on	education	(TEE);	REH/TEH	the	percentage	share	of	
government	recurrent	expenditure	on	health	(REH)	in	total	government	expenditure	on	
health	(TEH);	and	RET/TET	the	percentage	share	of	government	recurrent	expenditure	on	
transport	and	communications	(RET)	in	total	government	expenditure	on	transport	and	
communications	(TET).	Evidence	of	a	secular	decline	in	government	recurrent	expenditure	
as	a	whole	and	in	the	agricultural,	educational,	health,	and	transport	and	communications	
sectors	will	be	shown	by	the	presence	of	negative	and	statistically	significant	values	for	the	
coefficients	b1	,	b2,	b3,	b4	and	b5	respectively.	
Equations	(1)-(5)	were	estimated	by	ordinary	least-squares	regression	analysis	for	each	of	
the	54	LDCs	for	the	period	1965-1973.	The	sample	was	made	up	of	21	African,	13	Western	
Hemisphere,	11	Asian	and	nine	Middle	Eastern	and	Southern	European	LDCs.2	The	number	
of	negative	and	statistically	significant	regression	coefficients,	at	the	1	and	the	5%	levels	of	
confidence,	as	a	percentage	of	the	total	number	of	regression	coefficients	are	given	in	Table	
1	for	the	five	categories	of	expenditure	and	for	six	groups	of	LDCs	(total,	total	less	Middle	
East	and	Southern	Europe,3	African,	Western	Hemisphere,	Asian,	and	Middle	Eastern	and	
Southern	European).	
For	the	TRE/TRCE	category	of	expenditure,	18.5%	and	32.5%	of	the	total	sample	of	LDCs	had	
statistically	significant	negative	coefficients	at	the	1	and	the	5%	levels	of	confidence	
respectively.	More	or	less	the	same	results	were	obtained	for	the	sub-total	sample	of	
countries	(20.0	and	35.6%).	The	percentages	of	the	coefficients	that	are	negative	and	
significant	are	much	higher	for	the	African	group	(33.3	and	49.4%),	and	much	lower	for	the	
Asian	group	(0	and	9.1%).	For	the	Middle	East	and	Southern	European	group	they	are	11.1	
and	33.3%	respectively.	The	overall	picture	is	therefore	that	the	majority	of	LDCs	did	not	
experience	a	secular	decline	in	total	government	recurrent	expenditure	over	the	period	
1965-1973.	
However,	these	results	do	not	show,	on	their	own,	that	there	had	not	been	a	secular	decline	
in	recurrent	expenditure.	The	absence	of	a	negative	and	a	significant	coefficient	when	
TRE/TRCE	is	regressed	on	time	(t)	may	be	due	to	changes	in	the	composition	of	the	
government	expenditure	programme.	Projects	requiring	a	higher	proportion	of	capital	to	
recurrent	expenditure	may	now	be	preferred	to	those	requiring	a	higher	proportion	of	
recurrent	to	capital	expenditure.	In	order	to	eliminate	this	‘compositional	effect’	to	a	certain	
extent,	we	have	to	look	at	the	recurrent	to	total	expenditure	ratio	at	the	sectoral	level.4		
The	analysis	at	the	sectoral	level	also	shows	that	there	had	not	been	a	secular	decline	in	
recurrent	expenditure	in	the	majority	of	LDCs	over	the	period	1965-	1973.	The	strongest	
evidence	of	a	secular	decline	in	recurrent	expenditure	was	found	in	the	health	sector,	but	
even	here	only	35.2%	of	the	54	LDCs	had	negative	and	significant	coefficients	at	the	5%	
confidence	level.	Among	the	regional	groups	the	strongest	support	was	found	in	the	
Western	Hemisphere	group	where	nearly	62%	of	the	LDCs	had	negative	and	significant	
coefficients	at	the	5%	level	of	confidence.5	At	the	1%	confidence	level	the	proportion	was	
only	46%.	
3.	INSTABILITY	IN	RECURRENT	EXPENDITURE	
Instability	indices,	measured	by	the	standard	errors	of	estimates	from	linear	regressions	on	
time	over	the	period	1965-1973,	are	presented	for	recurrent	and	capital	expenditures	in	
total	and	in	the	various	industry-groups	for	the	six	regional	groupings	of	LDCs.	The	
arithmetic	mean	and	the	median	values	of	these	indices	are	given	in	Table	2.	
The	table	shows	quite	clearly	that	recurrent	expenditure	is	more	unstable	than	capital	
expenditure	in	the	educational,	health	and	other	sectors.	In	the	educational	sector	
recurrent	expenditure	was	markedly	more	unstable	in	all	of	the	regional	groupings	whether	
the	arithmetic	mean	or	the	median	values	are	used.	The	same	is	true	of	the	position	in	the	
health	sector,	with	the	single	exception	of	the	arithmetic	mean	value	for	the	Middle	East	
and	Southern	European	group,	and	of	the	position	in	the	other	sector,	with	the	single	
exception	of	the	arithmetic	mean	value	for	the	African	group.	
The	reverse	position	is	found	in	the	agricultural	and	the	transport	and	communications	
sectors.	The	values	of	the	instability	indices	for	recurrent	expenditure	are	lower	than	those	
for	capital	expenditure,	with	the	sole	exception	of	that	for	the	arithmetic	mean	for	the	
agricultural	sector	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	LDCs.	
Given	that	the	median	gives	a	more	representative	picture	than	the	arithmetic	mean,	the	
overwhelming	conclusion	is	that	there	is	strong	evidence	that	recurrent	expenditure	
fluctuated	more	than	capital	expenditure	in	the	educational,	health	and	other	sectors,	while	
the	reverse	is	true	in	the	agricultural	and	the	transport	sectors.	
The	total	recurrent	expenditure	was	more	unstable	for	all	but	the	Asian	group	of	LDCs	when	
the	arithmetic	mean	values	are	used.	However,	when	the	median	values	are	used,	the	
reverse	is	true,	with	the	sole	exception	of	the	‘total	less	the	Middle	East	and	Southern	
Europe’	group.	These	results	suggest	that	the	total	recurrent	expenditures	of	certain	LDCs	in	
Africa,	the	Western	Hemisphere,	and	the	Middle	East	and	Southern	Europe	were	extremely	
unstable	and	were	very	unrepresentative	of	the	general	level	of	instability	in	their	
respective	groups.	For	the	LDCs	as	a	whole	and	for	each	of	the	African,	Western	
Hemisphere,	Asian,	and	Middle	East	and	Southern	European	groups,	there	is	no	evidence	
that	the	total	recurrent	expenditure	is	more	unstable	than	the	total	capital	expenditure.	
This	is	due	to	the	greater	importance	of	the	agricultural	and	transport	sectors	and	the	
relative	stability	of	the	recurrent	expenditure	in	these	two	sectors.	However,	the	overall	
result	should	not	hide	the	fact	that	recurrent	expenditure	in	the	educational,	health,	and	
other	sectors	of	the	economy	were	much	more	unstable	than	capital	expenditure	in	all	of	
the	LDCs.		
	
	
4.	CONCLUDING	REMARKS	
There	is	little	evidence	in	most	LDCs	of	a	secular	decline	in	recurrent	expenditure	over	the	
period	1965-1973.	The	coefficients	obtained	by	regressing	the	recurrent	expenditure	to	
total	expenditure	ratios	upon	time	are	negative	and	statistically	significant	in	only	a	minority	
of	the	LDCs,	whether	the	analysis	was	conducted	at	the	aggregative	or	the	sectoral	level.	
Recurrent	expenditure	fluctuated	more	than	capital	expenditure	in	the	educational,	health	
and	other	sectors,	while	the	reverse	is	true	in	the	agricultural	and	the	transport	sectors.	The	
greater	importance	of	the	latter	two	sectors	meant	that	the	total	capital	expenditure	
fluctuated	more	than	the	total	recurrent	expenditure.	It	also	points	out	the	dangers	of	
generalizing	about	the	extent	of	instability	in	recurrent	expenditure	across	sectors.	
Overall,	then,	there	does	not	seem	to	be	much	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	recurrent	
expenditure	is	considered	by	most	governments	to	be	consumption	expenditure	and	hence	
more	dispensable	than	capital	expenditure	for	our	group	of	LDCs	over	the	period	1965-	
1973.	However,	this	result	must	remain	tentative	because	the	time-series	used	may	not	be	
long	enough	for	meaningful	trend	values	to	be	obtained	and	the	sample,	especially	at	the	
regional	level,	may	not	be	large	enough	for	meaningful	generalizations	to	be	made.	
	
NOTES	
1. P.	Heller,	‘The	underfinancing	of	recurrent	developments	costs’,	Finance	and	
Development	(March	1979),	p.	39.	
2. Africa:	Algeria,	Botswana,	Burundi,	Egypt,		Ethiopia,	Ghana,	Kenya,	Libya,	Malawi,	
Mauritius,		Morocco,	Nigeria,	Rwanda,	Senegal,	Sierra	Leone,		Sudan,	Tanzania,	Tunisia,	
Uganda,	Zaire	and	Zambia;	Western	Hemisphere:	Argentina,	Barbados,	Bolivia,		Brazil,	
Guatemala,	Guyana,	Honduras,	Jamaica,		Panama,	Paraguay,	Peru,	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	
and		Venezuela;	Asia:	Afghanistan,	Burma,	Hong	Kong,		India,	Malaysia,	Nepal,	
Philippines,	Singapore,	South	Korea,	Sri	Lanka,	and	Thailand;	Middle	East	and	Southern	
Europe:	Cyprus,	Greece,	Iran,	Iraq,	Israel,	Kuwait,	Saudi	Arabia,	Syria	and	Turkey.		The	
data	are	taken	from	The	World	Bank,	World	Tables	1976	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	
University	Press,	1977).		
3. This	sub-total	was	used	because	the	countries	in	the	Middle	East	and	Southern	Europe	
possess	many	characteristics	which	differ	significantly	from	those	present	in	the	other	
countries		
4. Of	course,	even	within	a	sector	certain	projects	wilI	be	more	dependent	on	capital	
expenditure	than	others	so	that	the	‘compositional	effect’	will	not	be	eliminated	
altogether.		
5. This	is	the	only	instance	where	a	figure	of	over	50%	was	recorded.			
